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Abstract: Security and privacy issues are rarely taken into account in automated systems for monitoring elderly people
in their home, exposing inhabitants to a number of threats they are usually not aware of. As a case study
to expose the major vulnerabilities these systems are exposed to, this paper reviews a generic example of
automated healthcare monitoring system. The security and privacy issues identified in this case study can be
easily generalised and regarded as alarm bells for all the pervasive healthcare professionals.
1 INTRODUCTION
Health monitoring systems are getting more and more
common (Pantelopoulos and Bourbakis, 2010). In
particular, elderly patients require systematic and
continuous monitoring in order to promptly detect
anomalous changes in their health. With the devel-
opment of new technologies such as mobile comput-
ing and wireless sensor network (WSN), many solu-
tions specifically aimed at elder persons have been
proposed. Generally, several wireless communica-
tion devices are employed and combined with med-
ical sensors, to monitor senior citizens from various
points of view (Tsukiyama, 2015; Kotz et al., 2009;
Dasios et al., 2015). Surprisingly, many of the pro-
posed systems are not taking into account what secu-
rity threats the installation provides and which privacy
measures are needed. The security risks associated
with such systems, indeed, can represent a high con-
cern, because of the sensitive information these ser-
vices can deal with.
In this paper we want to raise the awareness about
the lack of concerns many solution providers show
regarding such risks. To do so, we will look at the
main weakness of one of these systems, namely a
general monitoring system for elderly (Dasios et al.,
2015) . This system has been chosen because it is
generic enough to provide a good representation
of the health monitoring systems available, which
are mostly surveillance, only wearable, or mostly
environmental sensors. Common for most systems is
that none of them have taken security into account,
except for adopting encryption for the network
protocols. In this paper we want to show which
security measures should be investigated in all kind
of monitoring systems, by making a risk analysis
and threat model for the mentioned system. We
also investigate which privacy measures should be
stated before implementing the systems. One major
contribution will be stating which impact can have
the traffic analysis on a health care system, when
burglars are planning a break-in. The case study aims
at identifying a number of main guidelines to follow
in order to propose e-health monitoring systems that
should guarantee a reasonable level of security.
Outline of the Paper. We describe the case study in
Section 2 and then we focus on what impact the health
monitoring system can have (Section 3). In Section 4
we present different attacks, as well as vulnerabilities
the used network protocols raise. Then we analyse
which privacy measures should be taken into account
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 ENVIRONMENTAL SENSOR
NETWORK
The system we are going to asses is the environ-
mental sensor network described in (Dasios et al.,
2015) (sketched in Fig. 1). This monitoring system
aims to give an overall health estimation of the el-
derly at a low cost, without using cameras and mi-
crophones, which according to the paper are ”com-
monly perceived as privacy violators”. They also seek
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Figure 1: Architecture of the considered environmental sen-
sor network (picture taken from (Dasios et al., 2015)).
a minimal amount of wearable devices. These goals
are obtained by a WSN of nine nodes. Four room
nodes measure movement, light, temperature, elec-
tricity consumption, water flow, and pressure, in order
to give an overall assessment of what the senior citi-
zen is doing. Sensors on the chairs detects the pres-
ence of a person seating on a chair. A wearable sensor
serves as fall detector and as a panic button to call for
help. An actuator enables remote control of certain
electrical installations such as climate control. Lastly,
a coordinator node works as a sink for the WSN, han-
dling data from the network to a web interface and
vice versa. The WSN uses ZigBee (see Section 4) to
communicate to the sink, that, in turn, uses a wired
internet connection sending all the data to a MySQL
database and deploying the data on a Web site.
3 THREAT MODEL
The threat model is essentially composed by assets,
threats, attackers, attacks and vulnerabilities of the
system. The final aim is to enable an informed
decision-making about application security risk.
Assets. The reason for installing monitoring health
care systems, is to be able to take care of the elderly.
The system reviewed in this paper strives to detect life
threatening events and preserving good health, which
must be the main assets for the elder. Installing such
systems should give the elder a secure feeling of liv-
ing on their own, while not using an extensive amount
of communal resources in salary for health care per-
sonnel. Other assets for the elder which are not taken
into account in the considered health monitoring sys-
tem are dignity, possessions of the elder and revealing
of activities and location. The environmental sensor
network presents a possibility of remotely changing
the climate, which they state as an asset for the el-
der, but with modern technology, this should not be a
problem to handle by the elder. In Fig. 2 we list all
the considered assets with respect to what we think
would be their value for the elder, where we adopted
a scale from 1 to 5: very low value (1), low value (2),
medium value (3), high value (4), very high value (5).
Figure 2: Considered assets, with priorities related to their
value for the elder and attackers, with existence likelihood
and technical knowledge to exploit a system.
Threats. When looking at the system, the major
threats of the assets are false positives, false nega-
tives, or exposure of data. In particular, the exposure
of personal health data, location of the elder, and
activities. False positives and false negatives are
related to the considered assets. A false positive
is when the monitoring system misunderstands the
status of the elder (for example, raising a false alarm).
Conversely, a false negative is when the system fails
to detect situations in which the assets are threatened.
Attackers. We have defined three main types of at-
tackers (inheritors, criminals and burglars) as summa-
rized in Fig. 2, where also their existence likelihood
(from 1: very low, to 5: very high) and related techni-
cal knowledge to exploit a system (from 1: very low,
to 5: very high) are reported.
Inheritor. The most important assets defined, such
as life, good health and feeling secure are very dear to
the elder, but not something that a lot of others have
interest in taking. The only identified attacker for
these assets is the inheritor, who would benefit from
an early exit for the elder. The inheritor is defined to
have less technical (that is, user level) knowledge of
the system and very small probability of existing.
Criminals. Dignity and indoor climate could be
used as blackmailing material and cons for criminals
in order to get to the elders possessions. According
to Danish police statistic over criminal charges1 there
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and these are mostly committed against elder people.
Since it is limited how much value the elder posses,
the major criminals are probably not going after the
elders homes. Due to this we asses the likelihood of
this as small, and the technical knowledge a bit higher
than the inheritor, since the criminals have a network
where they can distribute malicious tools.
Burglars. Possessions are also of great value to
burglars. Burglars are becoming more organized,
and according to a Danish assurance company they
often know what is valuable, and are quick to find
and take these items. Knowledge of where values are
kept could be fatal in a burglary, which often takes
short time. According to Danish police statistic over
criminal charges thefts happens more than 20 times as
much as robberies, which indicates that burglars tries
to avoid people when breaking in. Danish assurance
companies also advice their costumers to make their
home look inhabited when away, which includes not
stating their vacation on Facebook (Alka Ensurance,
2013). This indicates that knowledge of location and
activities can have a large impact for burglars when
choosing a place to break in. We asses the likelihood
of a burglar as high when the burglars are defined to
having little technical knowledge (see Fig. 2).
Attacks. We have identified five types of attack,
which are considered in this paper. These are cho-
sen because they show how serious and diverse can
be the attacks available for this types of systems.
Man in the Middle. Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)
is an attack type where the attacker relay and possi-
bly modify or permutate the communication between
two parties (Erickson, 2008). If the attacker is capa-
ble of intercepting or modifying the communication
into or out of the house, he will be capable of pre-
venting critical system updates, and prevent critical
information of going of the house. Additionally is a
man in the middle capable of sending fake messages,
stating that the elderly has fallen, hence summon the
health care company to assist the elderly without rea-
son. If the health care system uses cameras to monitor
the elderly, these pictures can be intercepted, and used
either for blackmailing the elderly or for locating pos-
session of value in the home of the elderly.
Denial of Service. If the health care systems are
targeted by a successful denial of service attack, it
will have severe consequences. All three health mon-
itoring systems rely on sending information out of the
house, if the user has fallen or anomalies is detected.
If a denial of service attack prevents this, the whole
system is compromised. The environmental sensor
network relies on communication between the sensors
and the sink. If this is prevented the system will be-
come useless, hence the denial of service would be
discovered, since the normal behavior sends steady
flow of information, not only when a problem arrives.
Compromise of the system in such way can lead to
death or injury of the elderly, or a decrease in feeling
secure.
Traffic Analysis. If the communication flow in
the system is analyzed, it might be possible to know
whether the elderly is home, is asleep or similar. This
information can be useful to a burglar, who doesn’t
want to be disturbed when breaking in.
Malware. Malicious software can be used to mod-
ify the system, such that it doesn’t fulfill the intended
purpose. This can be used to make denial of service
or man-in-the-middle attacks. Additionally malware
can be used for simple traffic analysis as well.
Social Engineering. Attacking the human directly
instead of the system has plenty of functions. It can
be used to get access to the barebone computer or the
sink to install malware, or it can be used to locate
the sensors of the network. Elderly people are more
vulnerable to social engineering than younger people
(Lahtiranta and Kimppa, 2006), hence it is a obvious
attack vector for the criminals.
Fig. 3 resumes the relations between threats at-
tacks and attackers we have above detailed.
Figure 3: Threat model for a health monitoring system,
linking assets to the different threats, attacks and attackers.
Vulnerabilities. The attackers can exploit several
vulnerabilities in order to realize the above attacks on
the assets, that can be related to the different protocols
or to the human being, as the social engineering-based
attacks. The considered vulnerabilities are discussed
in great detail in the following Section 4.
4 SECURITY AND PROTOCOLS
This Section addresses some security issues and
vulnerabilities that occur when implementing the sys-
tem. The network protocol used in the environmental
sensor network is ZigBee. This Section reviews how
MITM attacks, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks,
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and traffic analysis can occur. Then, we generically
describe how malware attacks and social engineering
can occur. We use the acquired information to
provide a risk assessment of the system.
ZigBee. ZigBee is widely used in pervasive com-
puting due to its low bandwidth, low cost, and low
power consumption (Stelte and Rodosek, 2013).
Our vulnerability analysis is based on KillerBee2, in
particular on its zbtumbler tool, which detects active
ZigBee networks, records and display information
about the found devices. This makes it easy to detect
whether or not ZigBee is in use.
MITM Attacks. zbreplay lounges a replay attack,
which is countered in (Stelte and Rodosek, 2013).
Another MITM attack is explained in (Choi et al.,
2013) and exploits a vulnerability in the key distri-
bution. In ZigBee the key is occasionally updated
over the air in standard mode, which makes this at-
tack quite realistic. The counter measures proposed
involve using public key encryption instead of sym-
metric encryption. A greater modification is needed,
and public key encryption.
DOS Attacks. zbassocflood uses a vulnerability in
ZigBee’s association method for new nodes joining
the network. This floods the coordinator node, creat-
ing denial of service from the coordinator note, which
is the sink of the sensor network. A counter measure
for this problem has been proposed in (Stelte and Ro-
dosek, 2013), by filtering the incoming traffic.
Traffic Analysis. zbsniff is a tool that sniffs and
analyses the network traffic, thus making network-
analysis easy to do. This is very difficult to prevent,
due to how easy ZigBee is to detect.
Malware. Unintended, malicious software is a prob-
lem in all the communication technologies described
above. If an attacker is able to inject malware into
the system, the attacker will be able to compromise
the whole system. Injection of the malware can be
done by physically plugging in the malware (e.g. by
a USB-stick) or using social engineering to get into
the house of the system. Alternatively is it possible to
access a wireless router, and through this get access
to a computer to inject the malware on. A firewall
and a strong security on the wireless network would
be a countermeasure to this.
Social Engineering. The last attack vector we ad-
dress is social engineering, covering actions where the
human is the target of the attack, rather than the sys-
tem (Bellovin, 2015). Examples of social engineer-
2https://github.com/riverloopsec/killerbee
ing attacks are phishing, elicitation and simple phone
calls, where the attacker pretends to be someone else
(e.g. the IT department) (Hadnagy, 2011). According
to Danmarks Statistik3 the average age of the victims
of trick theft (which can be assimilated to social en-
gineering) is 75 years. It is important to keep social
engineering in mind when implementing the health
care systems, where users primarily are elders. It is
impossible to make a comprehensive list of actions to
prevent social engineering, however some recommen-
dations can be given:
• Make sure the user of the system (the elderly peo-
ple) gets information about: system updates, visits
from technicians, who in call, if in doubt.
• As far as possible use technicians the user knows,
or send a known employee from the health care
organization together with the technician.
• If possible configure the system, such that the el-
der doesn’t have to know passwords, etc., such
that a social engineer cannot trick the password
from the elder.
Attackers. Based on the analyses in Sections 3 and
4 we will now define which attackers who are able to
carry out which attacks:
Inheritors. The computationally skills of the in-
heritors is limited according to our description in sec-
tion Section 3. Since the assets the inheritors are tar-
geting are the health and life of the elderly, denial of
service attack is their only obvious attack vector. Mal-
ware to perform these attacks are considered to hard
computationally for the inheritors to do, hence inheri-
tors rely on jamming equipment or similar to perform
the attack.
Criminals. Social engineering is the first and most
obvious option of the criminals. Since their target
is to blackmail the elderly, a lot of information is
needed. This information can be gathered by man-
in-the-middle attacks or traffic analysis. Malware is
an option for these attacks.
Burglars. The location of the elderly is the main
concern of the burglar. Traffic analysis is a good tool
for locating the elderly. Man-in-the-middle attacks
can be used to intercept pictures of the home of the
elderly to locate possessions of value, such that the
burglar knows where to look. Malware is one way to
conduct a traffic analysis or a man in the middle at-
tack, however it is difficult for the burglar to to able to
plant the malware in the system.
3http://www.dst.dk/da/presse/Pressemeddelelser/2002
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4.1 Risk Assessment
As a final evaluation of the above analysis, having de-
fined the risks and threats of the systems in Section 3
and the vulnerabilities of the system in the above sec-
tions, we can propose an overview of the five differ-
ent attack vectors in the system of the considered case
study. We start considering easiness and availability
of performing the attack, proposing a score for each
attack vector. The final outcome is shown in Fig. 4,
where, again, we used a scale from 1 to 5, where 1
means very low risk and 5 means very high risk. It is
quite clear that the proposed system is most vulnera-
ble to traffic analysis, as well as the social engineer-
ing, even if this is a more general problem, not only
related to the specific system.
Figure 4: Easiness and availability of the different attacks,
given the vulnerabilities of the system.
The challenges of traffic analysis are that it is very
hard to prevent. The use of wireless protocols is al-
ways detectable. Even if the data in the communica-
tion is encrypted, it is still possible to detect the pres-
ence of the data flow.
The full overview of how critical each security
issue is, with respect to the assets, can be found in
Fig. 5. The scores are calculated as follows.
Probability Score. The probability score is a mea-
sure of probability of compromising the asset. The
value is calculated as the average of the prod-
uct of the each attackers value (found in Fig. 2)
and the linked attack vectors scores (found in
Fig. 4) divided by 5 and rounded up. As an ex-
ample the probability of compromising dignity is:
Value Score. The values are defined as the assets
value and are scored similar to the score applied to
each asset in Fig. 2.
Final Score. The final score reveals the overall risk for
compromise of this asset the score is calculated as the
probability score multiplied by the value score. This
reveals a new assessment scale from 1 to 25. Since
we do not get above 9 in our assessment we have only
colored the scale from 1 to 9, introducing dark green
as better than green, dark red as worse than red, and
brown as worst in order to easily distinguish between
the risks. This is justifiable since everything above 10
could cause serious health problems because of the
sensitive subject of health care is, taking care of the
already weakened citizens.
Figure 5: Final results of the risk analysis, stating the dif-
ferent risks for the different considered assets.
Fig. 5 reveals that the must critical asset for the
elderly is possession, followed by revealing of activi-
ties, and revealing of location. The assets most com-
promised are targeted by burglars doing traffic analy-
sis. It is not impossible to imagine a scenario where
a one of the health care systems is widely used, and
a burglar will walk around a neighborhood, and use
traffic analysis to find out where the systems are used.
If the burglar knows in which houses the systems are
used, he will be able to determine if the elderly is
home, or not, and can then conduct a break-in, with-
out being disturbed.
5 PRIVACY AND EQUIPMENT
This Section deals with the privacy issues occurring
when monitoring the elderly (the user from now
on). We use the Common Framework by Markle
Foundation (Markle Foundation, 2008) as a base
for the analysis, since it has been recommended for
health systems in an extensive analysis for privacy
frameworks (Kotz et al., 2009).
Openness and Transparency. It is important that the
user of system knows exactly what data that is col-
lected about her and how this data is used. Further-
more it is important to state who has access to this
data and where and how the data is stored.
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Purpose Specification. It is important that the
collected data is used only for its purpose. If the data
is intended to be used for new purposes it should be
accepted by the user beforehand. If the user is unable
to make that decision, it should be clear who can
vouch for the decision (children or other next-of-kin).
Collection Limitation and Data Minimisation. The
stored data should be limited to a minimum. Exam-
ple: there is no need for storing fall detection data,
as long as the user hasn’t fallen. It is important to
inform the user of the amount of stored data and how
long time the data is stored.
Use Limitation. The collection of health data is very
personal information for the user, and it is important
that the integrity of the data is ensured, and that the
data in no situation is made available to other than
authorized users of the system.
Individual Participation and Control. Users should
be able to access their own stored data, and should be
able to control who else have access to these data.
Data Quality and Integrity. Only relevant data
should be stored and should be up-to-date. Old and
irrelevant data should be removed as soon as possible.
Security Safeguards and Controls. All means for
protecting the data should be taken, when collection,
analyzing, transmitting and storing the data.
Accountability and Oversight. The company or peo-
ple in charge of the health care system must be held
accountable for any breach of the security or privacy
issues of the system. The system uses many differ-
ent sensors, and it is important for each type of sensor
to tell the user exactly what is stored. The system is
used for detecting and analysing the environment the
user lives in, hence a certain amount of data will have
to be collected and stored for the system to be suffi-
cient. If compromised this system will reveal a great
amount of personal data about the user, and it is im-
portant that the user is aware of this, and that security
measures are launched and maintained.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have considered a reference health
monitoring system for elderly people as a case study
to state the security and privacy risks one should be
aware of before implementing such kind of systems.
In particular, we have identified attack vectors and
groups of attackers, who could compromise the health
monitoring system. Moreover, we have raised some
privacy issues to address when people are monitored
in their own home. Due to the fact that personal data
is transmitted and stored on external servers, it should
be stated who can access the data and who can be held
accountable if data is lost or leaked.
Our major contribution has been the identification
of the burglar threat, which could be very prominent
if one healthcare system is used in large scale, be-
cause traffic analysis is not something a communica-
tion protocol can secure, the defence needs to be im-
plemented as a part of what is communicated, which
is easy to oversee by the developer.
The aim of the paper is to raise the levels of aware-
ness and understanding of the cyber risks related to
home monitoring systems. The hope is that the issues
identified in this case study will be regarded as alarm
bells for all the pervasive healthcare sector.
REFERENCES
Alka Ensurance (2013). Her er man mest udsat for indbrud!
(retrieved on http://www.alka.dk/).
Bellovin, S. M. (2015). Thinking Security - Stopping Next
Year’s Hackers. Addison-Wesley.
Choi, K., Kim, M., and Chae, K. (2013). Secure and
Lightweight Key Distribution with ZigBee Pro for
Ubiquitous Sensor Networks. IJDSN, 9(7).
Dasios, A., Gavalas, D., Pantziou, G., and Konstantopou-
los, C. (2015). Wireless sensor network deployment
for remote elderly care monitoring. In Proc. of PE-
TRA’15. ACM.
Erickson, J. (2008). Hacking: The Art of Exploitation. No
Starch Press.
Hadnagy, C. (2011). Social Engineering: The Art of Human
Hacking. Wiley Publishing, Inc.
Kotz, D., Avancha, S., and Baxi, A. (2009). A privacy
framework for mobile health and home-care systems.
In Proc. of SPIMACS’09. ACM.
Lahtiranta, J. and Kimppa, K. (2006). Elderly people and
emerging threats of the internet and new media. In
Proc. of I3E 2006. Springer.
Markle Foundation (2008). Common framework for net-
worked personal health information: Overview and
Principles. Connecting for Health.
Pantelopoulos, A. and Bourbakis, N. G. (2010). A survey on
wearable sensor-based systems for health monitoring
and prognosis. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man,
and Cybernetics, Part C, 40(1):1–12.
Stelte, B. and Rodosek, G. (2013). Thwarting attacks on
zigbee - removal of the killerbee stinger. In Proc. of
CNSM’13.
Tsukiyama, T. (2015). In-home health monitoring system
for solitary elderly. In Proc. of EUSPN’15/ICTH’15.
Procedia Computer Science, Elsevier.
HEALTHINF 2017 - 10th International Conference on Health Informatics
388
